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  DONOR UNKNOWN: ASSESSING THE 








A number of donor-conceived offspring have expressed a need 
to know their genetic origins, but do they have a 
constitutionally protected right to know the identity of their 
biological progenitor? Several factors have triggered these 
rights claims and have re-invigorated the debate over whether 
egg and sperm donors should remain anonymous.1 First, there 
                                                
*  Editor’s Note: While this volume went to press, the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal released their decision in the Pratten case. See 
Pratten v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2012 BCCA 480.   
**  Vanessa Gruben is an Assistant Professor at the University of Ottawa, 
Faculty of Law. 
***  Daphne Gilbert is an Associate Professor at the University of Ottawa, 
Faculty of Law. 
1  This paper focuses on anonymous sperm donation, which has been 
better studied than ova donation for several reasons. Sperm donation 
is much more common in Canada than ova donation, although 
individuals are using donated ova more frequently: S Purewal &  
OBA van den Akker, “Systematic Review of Oocyte Donation: 
Investigating Attitudes, Motivations and Experiences” (2009) 15 
Human Reproductive Update 499.  This may be due in part to the fact 
that these donation processes are distinct. Unlike sperm donation, 
donating ova is physically intrusive and carries with it serious risks 
such as ovarian hyperstimulation. As a result, ova shortages are far 
greater than sperm shortages. This appears to be the case in the 
United Kingdom: Ilke Turkmendag et al, “The Removal of Donor 
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has been a shift to greater openness in the context of adoption, 
prompting many to ask whether a similar shift is warranted in 
the context of assisted human reproductive technologies 
(ARTs).2 Second, there is an increased emphasis on one’s 
family medical history and genetic information in the 
prevention and treatment of disease. Third, some countries 
have recently abolished donor anonymity including the United 
Kingdom,3 Sweden,4 the Netherlands,5 New Zealand and a 
couple of states in Australia.6 Finally, a number of donor-
conceived offspring are expressing a desire to learn more about 
their donors, including the donor’s identity. This quest for 
information has prompted some donor-conceived offspring to 
take action. Many have enrolled in donor registries, like the 
Donor Sibling Registry, where they hope to find their half-
                                                                                           
Anonymity in the UK: The Silencing of Claims by Would-be 
Parents” (2008) 22 Int’l JL Pol’y & Fam 283 at 297. 
2  Vital Statistics Act, RSO 1990, c V.4; Adoption Act, RSBC 1996, c 5. 
For a discussion of the movement towards greater openness, see 
Cindy Baldassi, “The Quest to Access Closed Adoption Files in 
Canada: Understanding Social Context and Legal Resistance to 
Change” (2005) 21 Can J Fam L 211.  
3  Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, c 37. See generally 
Eric Blyth & Lucy Frith, “Donor Conceived People’s Access to 
Genetic and Biographical History: An Analysis of Provisions in 
Different Jurisdictions Permitting Disclosure of Donor Identity” 
(2009) 23 Int’l JL Pol’y & Fam 174.  
4  Swedish Law on Artificial Insemination 1985, no 1140/l984. See also 
Ken Daniels, “The Swedish Insemination Act and Its Impact” (1994) 
34 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology 437. 
5  PMW Janssens et al “A New Dutch Law Regulating Provision of 
Identifying Information of Donors to Offspring: Background, Content 
and Impact” (2006) 21:4 Human Reproduction 852. 
6  Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (WA).  
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siblings or donors.7 Others, like Olivia Pratten, have turned to 
the courts in the hopes of bringing about legal reform in this 
area.8 
 
This paper explores the rights claims of donor 
offspring pursuant to section 15 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms (the Charter).9 In the first part, we 
describe the history of donor anonymity in Canada. In Part II, 
we describe the legal challenge to donor anonymity brought by 
Olivia Pratten. In Part III, we consider the equality dimensions 
to a constitutional claim against British Columbia’s Adoption 
Act under section 15 of the Charter. In our view, Justice 
Adair’s analysis misses the mark in several respects: her 
comparison of adoptees and donor offspring warrants more 
careful consideration; she was too quick to accept the manner 
of conception as an analogous ground while failing to consider 
the more appropriate ground of family status; and, her focus on 
whether the dignity of donor offspring has been violated as 
opposed to whether they have suffered prejudice, stereotyping 
or disadvantage was misplaced. We believe that it may be 
possible for donor offspring to address these shortcomings and 
we offer suggestions as to how to do so throughout. Assuming 
a violation of section 15 exists, in the fourth part, we discuss 
why the government will be hard pressed to establish that the 
limit on donor conceived offspring’s rights is a reasonable limit 
                                                
7  The Donor Sibling Registry, online: The Donor Sibling Registry 
<http://www.donorsiblingregistry.com>. 
8  Olivia Pratten v Attorney General of British Columbia and College of 
Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2011 BCSC 656, 235 CRR (2d) 
118 [Pratten]. Pratten (Statement of claim) online: Arvay Finlay 
Barristers <http://www.arvayfinlay.com/news/news-oct28-2008. 
html> [Pratten Statement of Claim]. 
9  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 
11. 
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that is demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic 
society.  
 
Importantly, this paper is limited in its scope in several 
respects. We do not address the argument that section 7 of the 
Charter confers upon donor offspring the right to know their 
genetic origins. We also restrict our analysis to sperm donors. 
Further, this paper is prospective in its focus. The question of 
retroactivity, specifically whether donor-conceived offspring 
have a right to access the confidential records of their gamete 
donors where the donation was made with an expectation that it 
would remain anonymous, is not considered. Whether these 
gamete donors have a right to privacy under such 
circumstances that may compete with and limit the scope of 
any rights donor-conceived offspring may enjoy is also outside 
the scope of this paper. In the end we conclude that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that donor-conceived offspring will 
demonstrate that their section 15 rights have been violated in a 
way that cannot be justified under section 1. Regardless of the 
outcome of this constitutional case, we believe that provincial 
legislatures across Canada must create a registry system for 
donor offspring that mirrors provincial adoption registries as 
soon as possible.     
 
THE HISTORY OF DONOR ANONYMITY IN CANADA 
 
In Canada, there is no prohibition on the use of anonymous 
donated sperm and egg to create one’s family and there is no 
law requiring the disclosure of a donor’s identity to the 
offspring. The federal Assisted Human Reproduction Act10 
(AHRA) protected the anonymity of gamete donors. However, 
these provisions are not in force and were declared ultra vires 
Parliament following the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
                                                
10  Assisted Human Reproduction Act, SC 2004, c 2 [AHRA]. 
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Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act11 in December 
2010. According to the Court, these provisions, together with 
several others, were matters that were concerned principally 
with health and fell within the legislative authority of the 
provinces. Although the Court did not declare these provisions 
to be of no force or effect, we believe that they will eventually 
be repealed by Parliament. In any event, it is clear that the 
regulation of donor anonymity now falls to the provinces.  
 
The decision to allow anonymous gamete donation 
under the AHRA was the subject of significant public debate 
and disagreement spanning many years. Indeed, the Royal 
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (Baird 
Commission)12 and the Standing Committee on Health13 
(Standing Committee) presented starkly different 
recommendations to Parliament on this difficult issue. The 
Baird Commission, albeit close to two decades ago, considered 
egg14 and sperm15 donation separately, but concluded that both 
should remain anonymous.16 The Standing Committee reached 
a different conclusion recommending that anonymous donation 
end on the basis “that where there is a conflict between the 
privacy rights of a donor and the rights of a resulting child to 
                                                
11  2010 SCC 61, [2010] 3 SCR 457. 
12  Canada, Proceed with Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission 
on New Reproductive Technologies, (Ottawa: Minister of 
Government Services Canada, 1993) [Proceed with Care]. 
13  Standing Committee on Health, Assisted Human Reproduction: 
Building Families (2001), online: Parliament of Canada 
<http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/committee/371/heal/reports/rp1
032041/healrp02/healrp02-e.pdf> [Building Families]. 
14  Proceed with Care, supra note 12 at 587. 
15  Proceed with Care, supra note 12 at 445. 
16  Proceed with Care, supra note 12 at 479 (Recommendation No 94),  
590 (Recommendation No 163).  
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know its heritage, the rights of the child should prevail.”17 
Ultimately, the AHRA reflected the Baird Commission’s 
recommendation that anonymous gamete donation continue.18  
 
Although the provisions of the AHRA are 
unconstitutional, it is useful to describe them as they form the 
backdrop against which the Pratten litigation evolved and was 
argued. It may also represent a possible model for a 
provincially-based donor registry. The AHRA protected the 
anonymity of donors by prohibiting the disclosure of 
identifying information about the donor without his or her 
consent.19 The AHRA authorized the disclosure of certain non-
identifying information about the donor to the donor-conceived 
offspring either indirectly by the licensee or directly by the 
Assisted Human Reproduction Agency of Canada (Agency), 
which played a key role in the collection, use and disclosure of 
information under the AHRA. The AHRA created an elaborate 
framework for the collection, use and disclosure of identifying 
and non-identifying “health reporting information” of donors, 
those undergoing ARTs, and donor-conceived offspring. Many 
of the details were to be contained in the regulations. However, 
the regulations were notdrafted, and therefore no registry was 
in place at the time of the Supreme Court case.20 Nevertheless, 
it is possible to make a few general comments about how 
identifying and non-identifying information was to be 
collected, used and disclosed under these now defunct 
provisions.21 
                                                
17  Building Families, supra note 13 at 21. 
18  AHRA, supra note 10 ss 14-18. 
19  AHRA, supra note 10 ss 15(4) (licensees), 18(2), 18(3) (Agency). 
20  AHRA, supra note 10 s 78. 
21  A detailed discussion of these provisions can be found in Vanessa 
Gruben, “Assisted Reproduction Without Assisting Over-Collection: 
Fair Information Practices and the Assisted Human Reproduction 
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Although the physician was required to collect both 
identifying and non-identifying information from the donor, the 
physician was only authorized to disclose certain non-
identifying information to the recipient of the donated sperm.22 
The disclosure of this information was intended to assist the 
recipient in selecting a donor and would likely have included 
the donor’s personal characteristics such as height, weight, eye 
colour, education, as well as the donor’s medical history.23 This 
non-identifying information could well have been provided to 
the donor-conceived offspring by the social parent.  
 
The Agency was also authorized to disclose certain 
non-identifying information directly to the offspring. The 
AHRA charged the Agency with creating a health information 
registry composed of identifying and non-identifying 
information of gamete donors, those who had undergone 
assisted human reproduction procedures and those who were 
conceived using ARTs.24 The Agency was to indirectly collect 
                                                                                           
Agency of Canada” (2009) 17 Health LJ 229 [“Assisting Over-
Collection”]. 
22  ARHA, supra note 10 at s 15(4). In addition, the AHRA authorizes the 
physician to disclose different fragments of the information collected 
from donors to a variety of parties for different purposes. See 
Vanessa Gruben, “Assisting Over-Collection”, ibid.  
23  Health reporting information is defined to include section 3 of the 
AHRA. The precise extent of the information to be collected will be 
set out in the regulations, which are not yet drafted. However, some 
experts have speculated on the extent and scope of this information, 
see Health Canada, Workshop on the Licensing and Regulation of 
Controlled Activities under the AHR Act and the Obligations of 
Licensees Regarding Health Reporting Information (11 July 2007) 
online: Health Canada <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hl-vs/pubs/ 
reprod/index-eng.php#_1> at 26.  
24  AHRA, supra note 10, s 17.  
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this information through the physician.25 The Agency could use 
and disclose the registry information for a number of 
purposes.26 The Agency could disclose certain non-identifying 
information about the donor to the donor-conceived offspring.27 
The Agency had the authority to advise any two individuals 
having reason to believe that one or both were conceived by 
means of an ART using human reproductive material whether 
they were genetically related and, if so, the nature of the 
relationship.28 In addition, the AHRA authorized the Agency to 
disclose the identity of a donor to a physician if, in the 
Agency's opinion, the disclosure was necessary to address a 
risk to the health or safety of a donor-conceived offspring.29 
The physician could not, however, disclose the donor’s 
identity. Thus, while the physician and the Agency were 
required to disclose certain non-identifying information about 
the donor, neither would be authorized to disclose the donor’s 
identifying information without his consent.  
 
Thus, the collection and disclosure of information 
about sperm donors and the resulting offspring now falls to the 
provinces. To date, no province has acted. This may be, in part, 
because of constitutional challenge by Olivia Pratten, a donor-
conceived offspring who has brought a lawsuit against the 
Attorney General of British Columbia. 30  
 
 
                                                
25  In this sense, the physician acts as an information intermediary for the 
Agency.  
26  Vanessa Gruben, “Assisting Over-Collection”, supra note 21.   
27  AHRA, supra note 10 s 18(3).  
28  AHRA, supra note 10 s 18(4). 
29  AHRA, supra note 10 s 18(7). 
30  Pratten, supra note 8. 
Donor Unknown 
 
THE PRATTEN LITIGATION 
 
Olivia Pratten is searching for information about her sperm 
donor or biological progenitor. In her lawsuit, she alleges that 
provincial legislation, or the lack thereof, violates the 
constitutional rights of donor-conceived offspring. First, 
Pratten argues that she has a free-standing constitutional right 
to know her biological origins and that the state must take 
legislative action to ensure that she can exercise this right. In 
the alternative, Pratten argues that the provincial rules 
authorizing the destruction of medical records after six years, 
including the medical records of sperm donors, violates her 
right to physical and psychological security of the person.31 
Pratten alleges that this deprivation is not in accordance with 
the principles of fundamental justice because it is “arbitrary, 
irrational, grossly disproportionate, grossly under-inclusive and 
contrary to the duty of the state to reasonably accommodate 
persons with disabilities.”32 Pratten’s section 7 claim was not 
successful at trial.33  
 
Second, Pratten argues that the Adoption Act violates 
section 15 of the Charter because it is underinclusive. British 
Columbia’s Adoption Act is different in many respects from the 
registry that was to be established pursuant to the AHRA.34 The 
Adoption Act establishes a legal mechanism through which 
                                                
31  Pratten Statement of Claim, supra note 8 at 29. 
32  Pratten Statement of Claim, supra note 8 at 30. 
33  Pratten, supra note 8 at para 316.  
34  Four other provinces have open adoption legislation, although each 
has different features: Ontario Access to Records, S.O. 2008, ch.5; 
Newfoundland Adoption Act,  SNL 1999, c A-2.1; Alberta Adoption 
Act, RSA 2000, c C-12; Adoption Information Disclosure 
Regulations, YOIC 1985/149 (Enabling Statute: Children's Act, RSY 
2002, c. 31).   
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adoptees can acquire information about their biological parents. 
It does so in three ways: it requires the collection of 
information about the medical and social history of the 
adoptee’s biological family; provides for the making of 
openness agreements which facilitate communication between 
the adoptee and the biological family; and, provides adoptees 
(adopted after 1996) with the opportunity to learn the identity 
of their biological parents (either through their original birth 
registrations or adoption orders). For those adopted before 
1996, identifying information may only be disclosed with the 
consent of both the adoptee and the birth parent(s).  An adoptee 
over the age of 19 and an adult relative of an adoptee over the 
age of 19 may register to exchange identifying information. 
Only where both have registered may identifying information 
about the other be disclosed. Notably, the Adoption Act permits 
either the adoptee or the biological parent(s), regardless of 
whether the adoption occurred before or after 1996, to file a no 
contact declaration which precludes contact between them. The 
adoption registry is restricted to adoptees and birth parents. It 
does not extend to gamete donors and donor-conceived 
offspring. 
 
At trial, Ms. Pratten’s claim under section 15 of the 
Charter succeeded.35 The British Columbia Supreme Court 
agreed that the Adoption Act violates section 15 because it fails 
to include donor-conceived offspring. As is discussed in greater 
depth below, Justice Adair concluded that because of the 
similarities between adoptees and donor-conceived offspring, 
the omission of donor offspring from the Adoption Act created 
a disadvantage to and perpetuated stereotypes about donor-
conceived offspring which resulted in discrimination. Justice 
Adair concluded that this violation of section 15 was not 
justifiable under section 1 of the Charter.36   
                                                
35  Pratten, supra note 8 at para 268. 
36  Pratten, supra note 8 at para 325. 
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The Attorney General of British Columbia appealed 
the Court’s decision on section 15 of the Charter to the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal. Ms. Pratten cross-appealed the 
Court’s decision on section 7 of the Charter. The Court of 
Appeal heard the appeal in February, 2012. To date, the Court 
of Appeal has not yet released a decision.  
 
SECTION 15: THE EQUALITY PROVISION 
 
This case provided one of the first opportunities for a judge to 
consider the proper approach to section 15 after the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s refashioning of its test in the Kapp37 and 
Withler38 decisions.  
 
A Brief Overview of Section 15 
 
Section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into 
force in 1985.  The current Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
of Canada, Chief Justice McLachlin, has described it as the 
most difficult right and section 15 has endured many efforts to 
interpret its meaning. For a decade (from 1999-2008), the 
prevailing approach in assessing whether government 
legislation or action violated section 15 was rooted in a three-
part test developed by the Supreme Court in Law v. Canada.39  
In short, the Law test made three broad inquiries, asking:  (1) if 
the impugned law (i) drew a formal distinction between the 
claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal 
characteristics, or (ii) failed to take into account the claimant’s 
already disadvantaged position within Canadian society 
                                                
37  R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 SCR 483 [Kapp]. 
38  Withler v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 12, [2011] 1 SCR 
396 [Withler]. 
39  Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 
SCR 497, 170 DLR (4th) 1.  
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resulting in substantively differential treatment between the 
claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal 
characteristics; (2) if the claimant was subject to differential 
treatment based on one or more enumerated or analogous 
ground; and (3) whether the differential treatment 
discriminated, by imposing a burden upon or withholding a 
benefit from the claimant in a manner which reflects the 
stereotypical application of presumed group or personal 
characteristics, or which otherwise has the effect of 
perpetuating or promoting the view that the individual is less 
capable or worthy of recognition or value as a human being or 
as a member of Canadian society, equally deserving of 
concern, respect, and consideration. The Law test proved 
difficult to apply and was the target of much critique from 
academics, activists and lawyers who found it unpredictable, 
unfair and counter-productive to the cause of promoting 
constitutional equality values.40 The most troubling aspect of 
the Law test was its focus on harms to human dignity as the 
essence of equality violations.  
 
In 2008, the Supreme Court refashioned the Law test, 
while purporting to return to the principles set out in its first 
section 15 case, Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia.41 
In Kapp, the Court emphasized that section 15 is “aimed at 
preventing discriminatory distinctions that impact adversely on 
members of groups identified by the grounds enumerated in 
section 15 and analogous grounds.”42 A judge must consider 
these two questions in assessing whether the equality provision 
in the Charter has been breached: (1) Does the law create a 
                                                
40  In Kapp, supra note 37, the Court included two footnotes outlining 
the various sources of academic critique of the Law test.  
41  Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143, 56 
DLR (4th) 1. 
42  Kapp, supra note 37 at 16. 
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distinction based on an enumerated or analogous 
ground? (2) Does the distinction create a disadvantage by 
perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping? In returning to its 
Andrews foundations, the Court distanced itself from the focus 
on human dignity that had confounded cases after Law. 
 
More recently, the Supreme Court tackled another 
persistent problem in section 15 cases:  the choice of the proper 
comparator group. In Withler, the Court revisited the 
appropriate role comparison should play in equality analysis 
and deemphasized the need to choose a single, “correct” 
comparator group. In the first step of the Kapp analysis, 
comparison helps to establish the distinction in treatment.  At 
this stage it is unnecessary to find a particular group that 
“precisely corresponds to the claimant group.”43  At the second 
step, the Court noted that “[c]omparison may bolster the 
contextual understanding of the claimant’s place within a 
legislative scheme and society at large, and thus help to 
determine whether the impugned law or decision perpetuates 
disadvantage or stereotyping.”44   
 
Justice Adair relied on both Kapp and Withler in her 
section 15 analysis in the Pratten decision. Her reasons are 
fairly short and she had little to go on in terms of examples of 
how to apply the Supreme Court’s new direction.  In our view, 
many of her conclusions are rooted in language and an 
approach that more properly follows the Law decision. In 
particular, the language she uses to support Ms. Pratten’s claim 
focuses on a dignity-style analysis.  The Pratten case may have 
been more successfully framed under Law then under the 
Supreme Court’s new direction in Kapp and Withler. This is 
ironic given an effort by section 15 scholars to encourage a 
                                                
43  Withler, supra note 38 at para 63. 
44  Ibid at para 65. 
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move away from Law, because of its tendency to result in 
denied claims.   
 
The First Challenge:  Comparative Analysis 
 
Justice Adair compared the claimant’s group of donor offspring 
to adopted children. The claim was argued as one of 
underinclusivity, with Ms. Pratten seeking inclusion in the 
legislative scheme that gives adopted children access to 
information about their birth parents. Ontario courts have 
rejected arguments in a similar vein brought by adopted 
children comparing themselves to the biologically born and 
raised.45  There is no constitutional right for adopted children to 
know the identity of their birth parents. Courts held that 
Ontario was not constitutionally required to ensure that adopted 
children had access to the identity of their birth parents.46  
 
There are obvious parallels between adopted children 
and donor offspring.  Individuals belonging to either group 
may not know the identity of one, or both, of their genetic 
progenitors. As discussed above, the practices of gamete 
donation and adoption have long histories of secrecy and 
anonymity.  Adopted children claim a “right to know” their 
genetic histories because that knowledge plays a key role in the 
positive development of their self-identity.47 On this basis, 
arguments surrounding the best interests of the child prompted 
legislative reforms that favoured disclosure over anonymity.48  
                                                
45  Ontario v Marchand (2006), 81 OR (3d) 172 ,142 CRR (2d) 25 (Ont 
Sup Ct), aff’d 2007 ONCA 787, 288 DLR (4th) 762 [Marchand cited 
to OR]. 
46  Cheskes v Ontario (Attorney General) (2007), 87 OR (3d) 581, 159 
CRR (2d) 191 [Cheskes] 
47  Turkmendag, supra note 1 at 289. 
48  Adoption Information Disclosure Act, 2005, SO 2005, c 25.   
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It can be argued that the same concerns that prompted these 
reforms are also present for donor-conceived offspring.  They 
too feel a need to know their genetic heritage.  Some argue that 
denying donor-conceived offspring access to the same type of 
regime available to adopted children is demeaning to their 
sense of self-worth. Differential treatment might suggest to 
donor-conceived offspring that their curiosity or need to know 
their biological heritage is less understandable, or less 
significant than the feelings and self-perception of adopted 
children.  Justice Adair accepted the parallels and concluded 
that donor offspring are subject to differential treatment. 
 
In our view, this conclusion was based on a superficial 
appreciation of the alleged harm.  To be fair, Justice Adair is 
clear in her findings of fact that many of the claimants 
arguments were uncontested by the government.49 We posit 
that despite the apparent similarities, there are differences 
between the process of adoption and the practice of gamete 
donation that may explain why adopted children are currently 
treated differently with respect to accessing the identity of their 
biological parents that the court should have addressed.  In the 
context of adoption, both parents are social parents, whereas a 
donor offspring is often the biological child of one of his 
parents.50 The adopted child was relinquished by his or her 
biological parents as opposed to a donor offspring who was, in 
essence, created by his or her social parents. Some argue that 
this is a critical distinction for adopted children who may face 
unique psychological struggles in feeling that they were “given 
away” at birth and may not know either of their biological 
                                                
49  Pratten, supra note 8 at 230, 232. 
50  However, there are an increasing number of people who are using 
donated embryos to create their families. See for example the embryo 
donation program operated through Beginnings, online: Beginnings 
Family Services <http://www.beginnings.ca/>. 
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parents. This perception could justify the distinction in 
treatment.51   
 
However, while it is true that donor offspring do not 
have to deal with the same form of rejection confronted by 
adopted children, this position assumes that the “need” 
expressed by adopted children to understand their genetic 
history is fuelled by feelings of rejection, rather than an innate 
desire to know their genetic make-up. This is arguably not the 
case. Some adopted children and donor offspring simply 
express desires to know which family member they look like, 
or whose mannerisms they have. This implies that adopted 
children feel an urge to connect with their genetic origins and 
are not just looking for answers about why they were given up 
for adoption.      
 
Others have tried to distinguish adopted children from 
donor-conceived offspring on the basis that a donor-conceived 
child integrates with the gestational mother during pregnancy 
and has the potential of experiencing breast-feeding.52 These 
arguments explain why a donor-conceived child may, or may 
not, bond faster with his or her mother as compared to an 
adopted child. Whether this is the case or not, the gestational 
experience does not necessarily take away from the desire the 
offspring has to ascertain the identity of his or her genetic 
father. It is not the case that the more a child bonds with one 
parent, the less they may want to know about the other.   
 
There is arguably a significant difference between a 
biological mother relinquishing a child for adoption after a 
pregnancy and childbirth and a man donating sperm. Aside 
                                                
51  Pasquale Patrizio et al, “Disclosure to Children Conceived with 
Donor Gametes Should be Optional” (2001) 16 Human Reproduction 
2036.  
52  Ibid. 
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from the obvious differences in physical burdens between the 
two experiences, presumably most children who are 
relinquished for adoption were not conceived expressly for that 
purpose.   Gamete donors on the other hand, whether sperm or 
egg donors, give up their genetic material in full appreciation 
that it will be used in in vitro or artificial insemination practices 
and may result in conception. Sperm donors in particular can 
become biological “parents” of multiple children arising from 
one donation.53 The position of women who give up a child for 
adoption and gamete donors is distinct in a way that makes 
those two groups incomparable. The children arising from 
those two groups however may have similar experiences and 
concerns about their genetic histories or a need to actually meet 
a biological parent.   
 
The question is really whether adopted children are 
distinct from donor-conceived offspring in such a way that 
warrants this differential treatment. If so, the distinction will 
not be considered discriminatory within the meaning of section 
15. The legislature implemented a pro-disclosure policy in 
order to address the negative ramifications experienced by 
                                                
53  As a result, many states impose limits on the number of offspring per 
gamete donor: PM Janssens et al, “Reconsidering the Number of 
Offspring Per Gamete Donor in the Dutch Open-Identity System” 
(2011) 14 Human Fertility 106; N Sawyer, “Sperm Donor Limits that 
Control for the 'Relative' Risk Associated with the Use of Open-
Identity Donors” (2010) 25 Human Reproduction 1089. The potential 
number of donor offspring arising from a single donor may have 
significant pragmatic consequences for any attempt to legislate 
information disclosure.  Sperm donors may be far more reluctant to 
register identifying or contact information, given that dozens of 
potential offspring may come forward.  The emotional reward of 
reconnecting with a single child given up for adoption seems 
manifestly different from the emotional minefield of discovering 
dozens of children.  Sperm donors do not even know for certain that 
their donation ever produces a child.   
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adopted children who did not know the identity of their 
biological parents. It is arguable that donor-conceived offspring 
also suffer these same negative consequences when denied 
access to their genetic heritage. If the similarities between 
donor-conceived offspring and adopted children can be 
successfully established and the differences adequately 
addressed, we believe the section 15 claim will be 
strengthened.   
  
The Kapp Test 
 
Step One:  The Ground of Discrimination 
 
After establishing differential treatment, a claimant must 
demonstrate that he or she belongs to a group that can be 
described in reference to one of the grounds of discrimination 
enumerated in section 15 or analogous thereto. Neither 
adoption nor gamete donation are listed are enumerated in 
section 15. In her class action suit, Olivia Pratten argued that 
she faces discriminatory treatment by virtue of the fact that she 
was conceived by gamete donation rather than by sexual 
intercourse. Her “mode of conception” is the location of her 
discrimination, “because of physical disability, sexual 
orientation, family status or is otherwise analogous to the 
grounds enumerated in that section.”54 This is a claim based on 
a relationship of association. It alleges that a child conceived 
by gamete donation suffers discrimination on the basis of a 
ground occupied by her legal parents. As a partner in a same-
sex relationship, or a woman with a disability unable to 
conceive or bear a biological child, or a single person wishing 
to raise a child, her parent occupied a ground that is either 
enumerated in section 15 or analogous thereto. The child 
herself is not a member of either an enumerated or analogous 
ground. Based on equality jurisprudence to date, it is unlikely a 
                                                
54  Pratten Statement of Claim, supra note 8 at 25. 
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section 15 claim can proceed on the basis of being related to, or 
impacted by (but not directly a member of) an enumerated or 
analogous ground. Certainly we can think of no examples 
where such a claim was successful.   
 
Justice Adair accepted the analogous ground of “mode 
of conception”. The criteria for describing an analogous ground 
were laid out in Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and 
Northern Affairs).55 The Supreme Court of Canada held that, 
“the thrust of identification of analogous grounds  . . . is to 
reveal grounds based on characteristics that we cannot change 
or that the government has no legitimate interest in expecting 
us to change to receive equal treatment under the law.”56 The 
focus should be on those personal characteristics that are 
immutable or constructively immutable. There is no doubt that 
a child conceived by gamete donation cannot change his or her 
status. One’s mode of conception is an immutable 
characteristic. It was solely on this basis that Justice Adair 
accepted the claimant’s argument that “mode of conception” is 
an analogous ground. However, in Corbiere, the Court argued 
that analogous grounds should be like those enumerated in that 
they should be grounds that have often served as a basis for 
stereotypical decision-making. Members of the analogous 
ground might be associated with a discrete and insular minority 
or a group that has been historically discriminated against.  
Certainly donor-conceived offspring are unable to change their 
status, but it is less clear whether one’s mode of conception 
leads to stereotypical decision-making on the part of 
governments, or historical patterns of discrimination. We do 
not think there is sufficient evidence of either to find that one’s 
“mode of conception” is an analogous ground under section 15. 
 
                                                
55  Corbiere v Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 
2 SCR 203, 173 DLR (4th) 1 [Corbiere cited to SCR]. 
56  Ibid at para 13. 
266 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [Vol. 27, 2011] 
 
One other option is to argue based on “family status”.  
There have been only a handful of cases launched by adopted 
children challenging anonymity provisions in provincial 
legislation governing adoption records. These cases have not 
engaged in a fulsome analysis of the issue and are inconclusive 
on whether adoption is an analogous ground.57 So for example, 
in Pringle v. Alberta (Human Rights, Multiculturalism and 
Citizenship Commission), McIntyre J. concluded with little 
explanation that the legislation governing the release of birth 
registrations drew a distinction between adult non-adopted 
children and adult adopted children, on the enumerated ground 
of “family status”, defined as “the status of being related to 
another person by blood, marriage or adoption.”58 Similarly, in 
Marchand v. Ontario, Frank J. accepted, without finding, that 
family status was an analogous ground, and ultimately 
concluded that the impugned provisions of the adoption law did 
not violate section 15 of the Charter.59 Adoption, however, 
would be an argument based on “family status” and not mode 
of conception (as adopted children would presumably be 
conceived primarily by sexual intercourse). The Supreme Court 
of Canada has not definitely ruled on whether ‘family status’ is 
                                                
57  In Pringle v Alberta (Human Rights, Multiculturalism and 
Citizenship Commission), 2004 ABQB 821, 246 DLR (4th) 502, 
McIntyre J. stated (at para 48) that the legislation governing the 
release of birth registrations drew a distinction “between adult non-
adoptees and adult adoptees, including Pringle, differential treatment 
on the enumerated ground of ‘family status’, defined as ‘the status of 
being related to another person by blood, marriage or adoption.’”  In 
Marchand, supra note 45, Frank J. reached only a provisional 
determination on the issue of the ground (at 139):  “The Attorney 
General takes no position as to whether adoption is an analogous 
ground.  For the purposes of this application, I accept that it is an 
analogous ground, but make no finding.”  
58  Ibid at 48. 
59  Supra note 45 at 139. 
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an analogous ground under section 15.60 Justice Adair did not 
address this question. We think this is a more promising avenue 
moving forward as it is likely claimants can adduce evidence 
that “family status” has been the origin of historic prejudice 
and stereotyping. Those kinds of arguments are more difficult 
with “mode of conception” given that there has been little time 




                                                
60  See Thibaudeau v Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 627, 124 DLR (4th) 449, 
per McLachlin J (separated or divorced custodial parenthood an 
analogous ground) and Schafer v Canada (Attorney General) (1997), 
35 OR (3d) 1, 149 DLR (4th) 704 (Ont CA), leave to appeal to SCC 
refused, [1998] 1 SCR xiv [Schafer cited to OR] (whether adoptive 
parent status is an analogous ground). The Ontario Court of Appeal 
reasoned (at paras 50-53):  “[I]t is not immediately apparent to me 
that the position of adoptive mothers constitutes an analogous ground. 
Women who have adopted one or more children are a relatively small 
minority of the population, but that minority is not discrete in the 
sense of separate or discernible, nor is it insular in the sense of 
isolated or self-contained. They are simply mothers and, as such, are 
indistinguishable from other mothers. I also have difficulty with 
Cameron J.'s statement that "adoptive parents have suffered historical 
and legal disadvantages as a result of their status as adoptive parents." 
The material filed, and in particular the affidavit of Charlene 
Elizabeth Miall, provides some foundation for a finding that social 
mythology regards blood ties as somehow "better", and infertility as a 
sign of "inadequacy". There can be no doubt, as well, that adopted 
children have suffered legal disadvantage, but the advantages denied 
adoptive parents, save for the Act itself, are neither impressive nor 
persuasive. I am not persuaded that women who adopt do so 
necessarily because of a personal characteristic that is immutable, or 
changeable only at unacceptable personal cost. Not all women who 
adopt do so for reasons of infertility or the medical risks associated 
with pregnancy. However, despite my reservations, I am prepared to 
assume, without deciding, that the position of adoptive mothers does 
in fact constitute an analogous ground in this situation.” 
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Step Two:  The Discrimination Analysis 
 
Assuming that a donor-conceived offspring could succeed at 
the first phase of the Kapp section 15 analysis, there remains 
the challenge of establishing that the government is treating 
this group in a way that perpetuates prejudice or stereotyping 
or creates disadvantage. Justice Adair agreed with the 
claimants that donor offspring have been historically 
disadvantaged.61 She concluded that donor offspring are 
stereotyped as not needing donor information because they 
have one genetic parent.  She accepted that “[d]onor offspring 
can carry the burden of stigma that comes of feeling that they 
are perceived as biological products.”62 As an example, she 
relied on the testimony of one witness, who confessed that he 
thinks of himself as “one of his lab experiments.”63 In our view 
however, the extrapolation of his private misgivings to the 
level of a stereotype or stigma impacting the entire group, 
seriously misrepresents the role that stereotyping and stigma 
play in discrimination analysis. Individual donor offspring may 
feel some psychological stress or embarrassment at their status, 
but this is not a widely-perceived association. In Marchand, the 
court refused to see a pattern of discrimination in disclosure 
regimes with respect to adopted children. Frank J. concluded 
that there  “is no credible evidence that shows this legislation 
promotes stereotypes or demeaning messages about adopted 
persons. The scheme does not make stereotypical assumptions 
about the applicant or adopted persons generally. It is not based 
on any misconception whereby adopted persons are unfairly 
portrayed as having undesirable traits, or traits that they do not 
possess.”64  
                                                
61  Pratten, supra note 8 at para 247. 
62  Ibid at 251.   
63  Ibid. 




In Schafer, the court made an obiter comment that 
adopted children have suffered “legal disadvantage.”65 This 
observation was unsupported by any further explanation and 
offered in the context of a discussion that disputed whether 
adoptive mothers constituted an analogous ground.  In Schafer, 
the court assumed without deciding that adoptive mothers 
could fit as an analogous ground, but seemed lukewarm to the 
idea. Whether their children have suffered from discrimination 
and prejudice would be relevant in the analysis. In Pringle, the 
Court relied on the dignity analysis in Law, and concluded that  
“knowledge of a person's past is undoubtedly integral to that 
person's emotional and physical well-being, and legislation 
impeding an adult adoptee's access to knowledge of his or her 
past demeans that adult adoptee's psychological and physical 
integrity or dignity.”66 While on its face, this reasoning is 
supportive of information disclosure, it is a problematic 
conclusion for the Pratten case in two respects.  First, the Court 
in Pringle gave too much weight to the notion that any 
distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground is 
prima facie discriminatory.67 This is a formalistic and not 
substantive approach to section 15 and not one that is endorsed 
by the Supreme Court of Canada. Second, the Court relies 
entirely on concerns about the psychological impact of 
anonymous donation. The Court’s new line of thinking on 
section 15 after Kapp has moved away from concerns with 
human dignity.  It is also evident that the greatest psychological 
harm could not be prevented by information disclosure 
regimes. Even in the adoption context, children are not allowed 
to independently seek parental information until they turn 18. 
In the donor-conceived offspring context, the feelings of being 
                                                
65  Schafer, supra note 60 at paras 50-53.   
66  Supra note 57 at 49. 
67  Ibid. 
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a “lab experiment” presumably arise as soon as the reality of 
the child’s conception is understood.   
 
Children conceived by artificial reproduction are a 
relatively new phenomenon and the practice is still not 
widespread.  While there are some parents who have publicly 
expressed concerns about the discrimination their donor-
conceived children may face, it is difficult to describe the 
location of that mistreatment.  Certainly, there is no legislation 
that makes any facial distinction amongst benefits or 
entitlements given to children as a class. The location of any 
discrimination could only be in terms of regimes of disclosure 
that differ in the provinces between adopted children and 
donor-conceived offspring. Courts should be reluctant to see a 
“history” of discrimination and prejudice arising from the very 
scheme attacked in a claim. The claimants suffer from the 
problem of having their discrimination defined only by the 
regime they challenge.    
 
Justice Adair’s reasoning on the discrimination step 
would likely face more success if it could be framed as a 
dignity violation under the old Law decision. Her reliance on 
the evidence of Mr. Adams68 suggests that she was moved by 
the individual experiences of the witnesses she heard. Her 
conclusions on stereotype however, do not seem borne out by 
the evidence as discriminatory or prejudicial.  For example, she 
argues, “[t]he more sinister stereotype is that donor offspring 
are, in a sense, manufactured, and either they lack normal 
human needs, or if they have needs, it is acceptable to ignore 
them.”69 Her judgment cites little objective evidence to support 
this conclusion, other than the arguments of some of the 
                                                
68  Pratten, supra note 8 at para 251. Mr. Adams is a donor offspring, 
who is now a medical researcher living in South Australia. Mr. 
Adams testified at the Pratten trial in British Columbia.  
69  Ibid. 
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claimants who testified as to their personal feelings of a loss of 
dignity. In Marchand, the Court came to a similar conclusion, 
as “the denial of the information that is the basis of the 
applicant's challenge is not the denial of a benefit conferred by 
law nor is it the imposition of a burden the law does not impose 
on others. The information the applicant seeks is available to 
non-adopted persons, not as a result of legislation, but through 
their personal circumstances. The applicant has not referred the 
court to any law to support her position to the contrary.”70 This 
is the most striking weakness in the Pratten case as well.  
While there may be psychological harm flowing from the 
absence of information, that blank slate does not result in any 
lived experience of prejudice, nor are donor-conceived 
offspring in any way differentiated by the government in a 
stereotypical way. To be successful under the Kapp framework, 
Pratten needs to adduce evidence of discrimination based on 
prejudice and stereotype, and shift her focus from the dignity 
harms she and other witnesses brought forward at trial.  This 
will be a difficult move.   
 
In our view, there are a number of challenges on appeal 
in the Pratten case. There are many obstacles to a successful 
section 15 claim, ranging from defining the analogous ground, 
the tenuous comparison between donor offspring and adopted 
children, and the establishment of discrimination. The lack of 
success in equality challenges by adopted children is indicative 
of the court’s reluctance to see a pattern of harmful 
stereotyping or prejudicial treatment. To succeed, a more 
fulsome analysis of the comparison between donor offspring 
and adopted children is warranted. Further, greater 
consideration of the ground of discrimination, “mode of 
conception” as opposed to “family status”, is necessary. 
Finally, evidence that the government is treating donor 
offspring in a way that perpetuates prejudice, stereotyping or 
                                                
70  Supra note 45 at para 145. 
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disadvantage, as described above, will be required to discharge 
the burden established in Kapp.  
 
SECTION 1: IS THE VIOLATION JUSTIFIABLE? 
 
Assuming the claimants are successful in a section 15 claim to 
the impugned provisions, the question remains whether the 
government can justify the violation at the section 1 stage of 
the case under R v Oakes.  
 
A Pressing and Substantial Objective 
 
The government would have to convince the Court that the 
exclusion of donor conceived offspring from the Adoption Act 
served an important governmental interest, and that the 
provisions were integral to the legislative objective as a whole.  
The purpose of the Adoption Act set out in section 2 is to 
“provide for new and permanent family ties through adoption, 
giving paramount consideration in every respect to the child’s 
best interest.”  Although the Adoption Act touches on many 
aspects of adoption, several sections of the Adoption Act 
promote openness by establishing an information registry for 
adoptees and biological parents.  The government could argue 
that it is reasonable to limit the adoption information registry to 
adoptees and to exclude donor conceived offspring for at least 
two reasons. Both arise from the unique concerns relating to 
the use of donated gametes.   
 
First, the government may argue that, unlike adoption, 
a regime requiring the collection, use and disclosure of donor 
information must ensure an adequate supply of donated sperm 
and egg to meet the reproductive needs of Canadians. As such, 
an information registry requiring the disclosure of identifying 
information should be limited to adoptees. Concerns about 
supply are frequently invoked as the principal reason for 
protecting donor anonymity and creating an information 
registry for donor-conceived offspring that only requires the 
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disclosure of non-identifying information about donors. To 
preserve the choice of individuals to use donated gametes to 
create their families, the government could argue that a 
plentiful source of donor gametes is required to protect the 
integrity of the system and to maintain genetic diversity within 
the recipient pool.   
 
Many fear a marked decline in donated sperm in the 
wake of abolishing donor anonymity.71 Donors may feel that it 
is in their best interests to remain anonymous in order to avoid 
the pitfalls of responsibility or obligation (legal or moral) that 
might attend a process which revealed their identities. Indeed, 
some have argued that the majority of donors only donate 
because they can remain anonymous and avoid all ties with the 
children produced by their donation. The only national survey 
conducted on the motivation of sperm donors in Canada 
indicated that maintaining anonymity was the “number one 
condition for sperm donation.”72 In Canada, concerns about 
supply are compounded by the  current prohibition on payment 
for gametes, which has resulted in heavy reliance on sperm 
imported from the United States; indeed there are currently 
only 39 sperm donors in Canada.73  A prohibition on payment 
for gametes combined with a requirement for the donor to 
disclose certain information, which is discussed below, could 
aggravate a supply shortage. 
 
Less is known about egg donation, the importance of 
anonymity for egg donors, and the potential impact on supply 
                                                
71  A Lalos et al, “Recruitment and Motivation of Semen Providers in 
Sweden” (2003) 18 Human Reproduction 212 at 212 (concern 
expressed in Sweden) [Lalos, “Recruitment”]. See also Janssens, 
supra note 5 at 854.  
72  Proceed with Care, supra note 12 at 442. 
73  Pratten, supra note 8 at para 163.  
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should anonymity be abolished. However, it is likely that 
similar concerns exist in respect of egg donation.  
 
Second, the government could argue that, unlike in 
adoption, it is in the best interests of donor-conceived offspring 
and their families to preserve the anonymity of one’s biological 
progenitor. The state has historically favoured gamete donor 
anonymity for a number of reasons. The considerable legal 
uncertainty about the parental status of donors in many 
provinces, unlike in adoption where the legal status of the 
biological parent is severed, may continue to justify preserving 
donor anonymity. As such, the government may argue that it is 
in the best interests of donor-conceived offspring and families 
to exclude offspring from a registry which requires the 
disclosure of identifying information about one’s biological 
progenitor.  
 
The government has long taken the position that donor 
anonymity is in the best interests of the family. Indeed, this 
position was maintained in the now defunct provisions of the 
AHRA described above. Historically, there was a concern that 
the use of ARTs and donor sperm threatened to undermine the 
family unit because of the stigma associated with infertility and 
illegitimacy.74 Some heterosexual parents worried that the 
offspring would reject the social father because there is no 
genetic bond between them.75 As a result, the use of these 
technologies was, and for some continues to be, shrouded in 
secrecy. Donor anonymity and the secrecy it enabled allowed 
                                                
74  Blyth & Frith, supra note 3 at 820.  
75  A Lalos et al, “Legislated Right for Donor-Insemination Children to 
Know Their Genetic Origin: A Study of Parental Thinking” (2007) 
22(6) Human Reproduction 1759, at 1766. This worry is so deep that 
many families do not want to disclose that the child was conceived 
through donor insemination, let alone advise the child that they have 
a right to obtain identifying information about the donor.  
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parent(s) to choose their preferred family form and promoted 
“their ability to form family bonds as they see fit.”76 
 
The state has also argued that donor anonymity is in 
the best interests of the donor-conceived offspring and the 
family because it allows him or her to develop stronger bonds 
with the newly formed family unit.77  As the Baird Commission 
explained, “knowing the identity of the donor may be seen by 
them [the family] to belittle their shared experience, as well as 
actual parenthood. If revelation of the donor’s identity is 
unwanted but is mandatory, it may well be at the expense of the 
well-being of the child and the social parents.”78 The concern is 
that the presence of the sperm donor in families would interfere 
with the bonding between the child and the legal parent. The 
unwanted presence of the donor could disrupt the “privacy and 
security” of the newly formed family.79 
 
The government’s concern about excluding the donor 
from the family unit persists today because of the uncertain 
parental status of sperm and egg donors in many provinces in 
Canada. Unlike in adoption, the parental status of the donor is 
not explicitly severed by legislation in many provinces, with 
the exception of Quebec, Alberta, Newfoundland and 
Labrador, and British Columbia.80 As a result, there is a great 
                                                
76  Proceed with Care, supra note 12 at 443. 
77  Ibid. 
78  Ibid. 
79 Eric Blyth and Abigail Farrand, "Anonymity in Donor-Assisted 
Conception and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child" 
(2004) 12 Int J Child Rts 89, at 92. See also Janssens, supra note 5 at 
854. 
80 Art 538 CCQ; Family Law Act, SA 2003, c F-4.5 (Alberta); 
Children’s Law Act, RSNL 1990, c C-1 (Newfoundland and 
Labrador); Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25 (British Columbia). For 
a discussion of the details of this legislation see Angela Cameron, 
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deal of ambiguity regarding the rights and responsibilities of 
the sperm donor vis-à-vis the donor-conceived offspring 
including child support and access.  
 
The concern about the parental status of the donor 
affects heterosexual families, however, it is particularly acute 
for lesbian-led and single mother families. Women-led families 
are uniquely affected by the possibility of the sperm donor 
intruding into and disrupting their family life because of the 
propensity of courts to insert a “father figure” into these family 
units. Indeed this concern is evident in a number of Canadian 
cases where the presence of a known donor has been the basis 
upon which the court has denied legal parenting rights to a non-
biological lesbian parent or given the donor access rights to the 
offspring.81 For example, a Quebec court has excluded the non-
biological lesbian mother by concluding that the biological 
lesbian mother and donor were in a “parental project” under 
article 538 of the Quebec Civil Code.82 The Quebec Court of 
Appeal applied similar reasoning in granting a known sperm 
donor parental status despite evidence that the single mother by 
choice did not intend from him to be involved as a parent.83 In 
Ontario, the court rejected a non-biological lesbian mother’s 
application to be recognized as a legal parent because the 
known sperm donor, who was actively involved in the child’s 
                                                                                           
“Women-led families, family law and assisted human reproductive 
technologies: families outside of the law” in Jennifer Kilty, ed, 
Women and the Law, Canadian Scholar’s Press, [forthcoming in 
2012].  
81  Angela Cameron, Vanessa Gruben & Fiona Kelly, “De-anonymising 
Sperm Donors in Canada: Some Doubts and Directions” (2010) 26 
Can J Fam L 95. 
82  SG v LC, [2004] RDF.517 (Sup Ct); But see LO v SJ, 2006 QCCS 
302 and  A v B, X, and C, 2007 QCCA 361, [2007] RJQ 525. 
83  LB et EB (pour X) c GN, 2011 QCCA 1180, leave to appeal to SCC 
denied [2011] SCCA No 444. 
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life, refused to consent. It will be interesting to see whether the 
court reaches a similar conclusion in De Blois v Lavigne, where 
a known donor who agreed to give up his parental rights and is 
now seeking parental status of the child contrary to the wishes 
of his lesbian co-parents.84 In light of these cases, women-led 
families may be especially reluctant about removing donor 
anonymity. In short, donor anonymity can be seen as protecting 
families from the unwanted intrusion of the sperm donor into 
their family. Whether the same concerns exist for egg donors 
remain to be seen. 
 
In our view, it is likely that the first of the government 
objectives (a desire to protect the integrity and supply of the 
donor system which could be seriously jeopardized if 
anonymity was prohibited) would likely be considered to be 
pressing and substantial. Similarly, the second objective, 
protecting donor-conceived offspring and the family unit, 
would likely also be described as pressing and substantial. To 
defeat the government at this stage, the claimant would have to 
refute that the government has any interest in encouraging 
gamete donation, and that it has no interest in the dynamics of 
the families involved in that process.  Given that the state’s 
interest in protecting the integrity of Canadian families is long-
standing85 it is unlikely the Court would deny the government’s 
interests here.   
 
The analysis would then turn to the second part of the 
section 1 test, proportionality, with its three sub-parts.   
 
 
                                                
84  Although the case has not yet been heard on the merits, DeBlois’s 
application for interim access to the child was denied by the court: 
DeBlois v Lavigne 2012 ONSC 3949 (available on Lexis). 
85  The state’s interest in the family is manifest in a number of contexts 
including marriage, divorce, support, custody & access.  
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A Rational Relationship 
 
Assuming the Court accepted the two objectives outlined 
above, the government would have to establish that there is a 
strong connection between excluding donor-conceived 
offspring from the adoption registry and its dual goals of 
guaranteeing the supply of donor gametes and protecting the 
best interests of families created through third party 
reproduction. In our view, the government’s argument may 
face some challenges at this stage. 
 
With respect to supply, the government would need to 
produce some evidence that the supply of egg and/or sperm 
would be threatened without guaranteed anonymity.  The 
government would not have to prove a definitive threat, but 
would have to satisfy the Court that it is likely that supply 
would diminish, and that a reduced supply would be harmful to 
the success of the assisted reproductive process.   
 
The government can only speculate as to whether this 
shortage will in fact occur in Canada. The experiences of other 
Western countries that have abolished donor anonymity offer 
some clues about the potential impact on sperm supply. 
Turkmendag et al’s review of the experience in various 
countries reveals that the effects of abolishing donor anonymity 
are “ambiguous” at best.86 This is, in part, because there are 
few studies on the impact on donor supply. Nevertheless, there 
appears to be a decline in sperm donation immediately 
following the abolition of donor anonymity, as seen in 
Sweden;87 the Netherlands;88 Western Australia;89 and, the 
                                                
86  Turkmendag, supra note 1 at 287.  
87  See also Daniels, supra note 4 at 439. However, other factors have 
been attributed to this decline in supply such as a tightening of the 
quality control requirements and an increase in the funding for 
foreign adoptions: Daniels, supra note 4 at 438. 
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United Kingdom,90 among others. However, in many countries, 
the initial decrease was followed by a gradual increase. An 
increase in supply was observed in Sweden.91 An increase in 
the United Kingdom has also been reported by the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, although some have 
argued that this has been the result of increases in the 
                                                                                           
88  Janssens, supra note 5 at 854. There was a decline in sperm donation 
during the period the possibility of abolishing donor anonymity was 
debated. This decline in availability may also attributed to the fact 
that a known sperm donor may want to greatly limit the number of 
children conceived with his gametes as the possibility of contact 
becomes a “psychological burden”: Janssens, supra note 5 at 855. 
Further, like in Sweden, additional quality guidelines may have also 
contributed to a decrease in the number of semen banks: Janssens, 
supra note 5 at 855. 
89  Kate Godman et al, “Potential Sperm Donors', Recipients' and their 
Partners' Opinions towards the Release of Identifying Information in 
Western Australia” (2006) 21 Human Reproduction 3022. Godman 
reports a 50% decrease in sperm donation following the abolition of 
donor anonymity.  
90  Turkmendag, supra note 2 at 294-95. 
91  Recruitment, supra note 71 at 212. 
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compensation of gamete donors92 and aggressive marketing 
campaigns for gamete donors.93  
 
In Canada, it is difficult to say whether the abolition of 
anonymity will result in decreased sperm supply. On the one 
hand, the supply problem may be mitigated by the large pool of 
sperm donors available in the United States, which are the 
primary source of sperm for Canadians. These concerns may 
also be mitigated by the prevalence of open-identity or identity 
release sperm donors, which are increasingly available to 
individuals wishing to use donated gametes to create their 
families.94 However, the abolition of donor anonymity together 
with a requirement for the donor to include certain information 
in a registry may negatively impact the importation of sperm 
from the United States to Canada. Indeed, there is some 
                                                
92  Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority (HFEA), News 
Release, “Number of sperm donors up following anonymity law 
changes”, (3 May 2007) online: Human Fertilization and Embryology 
Authority <http://www.hfea.gov.uk/465.html>. However, it appears 
that the HFEA is now considering lifting the ban on selling sperm and 
eggs in light of the shortage of donated gametes caused, in part, by 
the removal of donor anonymity in 2005: Mark Henderson, “Pay 
donors to end the shortage of IVF eggs, says UK watchdog” The 
[London] Times (July 27, 2009) online: The Times 
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk>. 
93  Jane Hughes, Egg and sperm donors: HFEA in drive to increase 
numbers” BBC News (4 April 2012) online: BBC News 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk>. 
94  Donors can either be known, that is they are known to the intended 
parents and the offspring from the outset; permanently unknown, 
often referred to as anonymous; or, identity-release where the donor’s 
identity is released when the offspring is eighteen years old. The 
latter is often termed “as-yet-unknown” donors: HMW Bos & EM 
Hakvoort, “Child Adjustment and Parenting in Planned Lesbian 
Families with Known and As-yet-unknown Donors” (2007) 28 J 
Journal of Psychosomatic Obstetrics & Gynecology 121 at 121-122. 
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question as to whether the introduction of registry system 
would be coupled with a ban on imported sperm because of the 
legal difficulties associated with regulating foreign donors, 
which is discussed in greater depth below.   
 
Thus, the impact of abolishing donor anonymity on 
gamete supply in Canada is unclear. However, the ambiguity 
surrounding the impact on supply may potentially undermine 
the state’s argument that a rational connection exists between 
maintaining donor anonymity and ensuring an adequate donor 
supply.  
 
With respect to the second objective, the government 
would need to successfully argue that, unlike adopted families, 
recipient families are better off under an anonymous regime, 
and that the exclusion of donor-conceived offspring from the 
adoption regime is rationally connected to its goal of protecting 
families created through the use of donated gametes.  
 
In our view, the connection between donor anonymity 
and protecting the integrity of the family unit may also be 
questioned. First and foremost, there is some empirical 
evidence that indicates that knowing the manner of one’s 
conception does not have a negative or detrimental impact on 
the offspring or their larger family unit.95 Indeed, these studies 
                                                
95  Tabitha Freeman & Susan Golombok, “Donor Insemination: A 
Follow-Up Study of Disclosure Decisions, Family Relationships and 
Child Adjustment at Adolescence” (2012) 25 Reproductive 
Biomedicine Online 193 at 194; K Vanfraussen et al, “Why Do 
Children Want to Know More About the Donor? The Experience of 
Youngsters Raised in Lesbian Families” (2003) 24 Journal of 
Psychosomatic Obstetrics & Gynecology 31 at 36; JE Scheib et al, 
“Adolescents with Open-Identity Sperm Donors: Reports from 12-17 
Year Olds” (2005) 20 Human Reproduction 239 at 248; V Jadva et al, 
“The Experiences of Adolescents and Adults Conceived by Sperm 
Donation: Comparisons by Age of Disclosure and Family Type” 
(2009) 24 Human Reproduction 1909 at 1910; E Lycett et al, 
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suggest that offspring who learn that they were conceived using 
donated sperm, gradually and at a young age, generally suffer 
no psychological harm and in most cases appear to be quite 
well-adjusted.96 This weakens the state’s historical concern 
about preserving donor anonymity in order to promote the best 
interests of the child and bonding in the new family unit. 
Second, the use of donor gametes is becoming increasingly 
common and as it does, the stigma associated with the use of 
these technologies continues to fade. Nevertheless, many 
parent(s) continue to keep the conception status of the offspring 
secret, out of concerns for family integrity, which is enabled by 
donor anonymity.  
 
Less clear, however, is the impact of an identity-
release donor on the well being and integrity of the various 
members of the family unit. Unfortunately, there are few 
studies regarding the psychological impact of knowing the 
donor’s identity (which may simply include knowing the name 
of the sperm donor or may extend to forming a relationship 
with the donor) on the donor-conceived offspring. Some 
scholars have speculated that “by providing personal 
information about the donor, a perceived emotional link 
between the child and donor could be created. This may cause 
a significant problem if the majority of sperm donors do not 
wish to have contact with recipients or any involvement with 
                                                                                           
“School-aged Children of Donor Insemination: A Study of Parents’ 
Disclosure Patterns” (2005) 20 Human Reproduction  810. See also P 
Casey, “Child Development and Parent-Child Relationships in 
Surrogacy, Egg Donation and Donor Insemination Families at Age 7” 
(Paper delivered at the 24th AGM of the Eureopean Society of Human 
Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE), Barcelona, Spain, July 
2008) cited in ESHRE, Focus on Reproduction, online: ESHRE 
<http://www.eshre.eu/binarydata.aspx?type=doc&sessionId=3qtq5c4
50mot2u55s4y01azl/ESHRE_Sep_08.pdf>. 
96  See all studies referenced above, ibid. 
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biological offspring born as a result of their donation.”97 To 
date, there is little evidence and only limited speculation about 
whether learning the donor’s identity upon the age of majority 
has a positive or negative impact on donor-conceived offspring.  
 
However, as mentioned above, there have been a 
number of troubling court decisions where known sperm 
donors have been awarded access to their offspring both in the 
context of lesbian-led and single mother families against the 
wishes of the intended parents.98 These decisions illustrate a 
tendency on the part of the courts to grant the donor access to 
the offspring under the guise that it is in the best interests of the 
donor-conceived offspring that he/she has a ‘father figure’. In 
our view, there is no question that these decisions undermine 
the intention of the legal parents and threaten the integrity of 
women-led families.  
 
Arguably, legal mechanisms, other than preserving 
donor anonymity, may effectively exclude the sperm donor 
from the family unit and thereby weaken the government’s 
rational connection argument. The first possibility is to delay 
the disclosure of the identifying information to the donor and 
offspring until the offspring reaches the age of majority when 
custody, access and support are no longer an issue. Notably, the 
                                                
97  Kate Godman et al, “Potential Sperm Donors', Recipients' and their 
Partners' Opinions towards the Release of Identifying Information in 
Western Australia” (2006) 21 Hum Reprod 3022, at 3025.  
98  Cameron, Gruben & Kelly, supra note. 81 See also Tom Blackwell, 
“Fertility Dispute Triggers Ripples of Concern Across Canada After 
Sperm Donor Wins Paternity Ruling”, The National Post (10 April 
2012) online: The National Post <http://news.nationalpost.com> 
referring to LB et EB (pour X) c GN, 2011 QCCA 1180 (available on 
QL). 
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adoption registry already does so.99 The second way to protect 
the family unit is through provincial legislation that confirms 
that the donor does not have parental status and ensures that the 
social parents enjoy full parental status.100 However, this type 
of legislation, while necessary, will certainly not preclude 
litigation of cases concerning the parental status and rights of 
known donors in Canadian families.101 In light of the gendered 
approach adopted by some courts in this context and the reality 
that parentage laws in most provinces do not reflect the 
realities of these new family forms, the government may well 
be able to demonstrate that a rational connection exists between 





This step in the section 1 analysis offers the most potential for 
claimants, for it is here that the Court often finds that the 
government has overstepped. While the government does not 
need to show that it considered every other possibility, it must 
satisfy the Court that it considered a range of options and chose 
a  “less harmful means of achieving the legislative goal.”102 If 
the claimants succeeded at the section 15 stage, it would be 
because they convinced the Court that they are sufficiently like 
adopted children to warrant some legislative regime that 
entitles them to know the identity of a biological parent. As we 
                                                
99 As discussed above, there are now provisions authorizing the disclosure 
of information about birth parents in the context of adoption in both 
Ontario (Vital Statistics Act, supra note 2) and British Columbia 
(Adoption Act, supra note 2).  
100  Cameron, Gruben & Kelly, supra note 81. 
101  Ibid.  
102  Alberta v Hutterian Bretheren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37 at 
para 54, [2009] 2 SCR 567 [Hutterian Bretheren]. 
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have noted, courts have been reluctant to constitutionalize a 
“right to know” for adopted children.103 This group has access 
to identifying information because of a proactive legislative 
initiative and not because governments are constitutionally 
compelled to divulge the identity of biological parents.  
However, should donor-conceived offspring succeed in arguing 
that the information regime for adoptees should be extended to 
cover their circumstances, it is unlikely the government could 
successfully argue that the absence of any legislation 
governing the collection and disclosure of identifying and non-
identifying information from donors to offspring is a minimally 
impairing process.   
 
As discussed above, there is currently no provincial or 
federal law requiring the collection of information from gamete 
donors and the disclosure of any information, identifying or 
not, to the offspring. The AHRA established a regime that 
protected the anonymity of the donor yet ensured that the 
offspring received relevant non-identifying information about 
the donor and, in certain circumstances, his or her half-siblings. 
As these provisions are now defunct, and the provincial 
governments have not filled this legislative gap, it is unlikely 
that the government would succeed in arguing that its exclusion 
of donor conceived offspring from the adoption registry is 
minimally impairing.  
 
What if a province enacted a registry akin to the now 
defunct federal regime? Would this satisfy the minimal 
impairment criteria? An information registry like the one 
described in the AHRA addressed many of the health concerns 
                                                
103 Cheskes, supra note 46 and Marchand, supra note 45. See also, 
Vanessa Gruben, “A Number but No Name: Is There a Constitutional 
Right to Know One’s Sperm Donor in Canadian Law?” (University 
of Toronto Press) [Forthcoming] [Gruben, “A Number”].    
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shared by adoptees and donor offspring.104 The offspring, like 
the adoptee, would receive a family medical history about his 
or her biological progenitor. Further, the offspring, like the 
adoptee, would receive certain psychosocial information about 
his or her biological progenitor, like the donor’s phenotype, 
education and interests, to name but a few. The registry could 
also include a mechanism whereby donor offspring could 
determine whether a prospective intimate partner was a half 
sibling. Each of these features of the registry would ensure that 
donor offspring received much of the same type of information 
about their donors as adoptees do. The only difference 
remaining would be the absence of the donor’s identity and 
contact information. Notably, this type of registry is 
prospective and would not have applied retroactively.105  
 
It is difficult to say whether a registry that includes non-
identifying information only would satisfy the minimally 
impairing standard. Notably, Justice Adair, in the context of 
her section 7 analysis made the following factual findings 
regarding the physical and psychological harm that donor 
offspring who have no information, either identifying or non-
identifying, may experience: 
 
(a)  some donor offspring do not have access to 
what might be important background medical 
information that would assist in early 
identification of illness or disease and in 
treatment, and do not have access to this 
information even in circumstances of medical 
necessity; 
 
                                                
104  See Part I. 
105 The question of retroactivity is addressed in greater depth in Vanessa 
Gruben, “A Number”, supra note 103.  
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(b) some donor offspring do not have access to 
a biological parent’s medical history, and as a 
result are impaired in identifying or treating 
genetic conditions; 
 
(c) without further biological testing, some 
donor offspring do not have the information 
required to determine if another individual is a 
biological half-sibling, and are therefore at risk 
for inadvertent consanguinity; 
 
(d) some donor offspring do not have access to 
important information about their paternal 
heritage, culture, religion and other elements 
that are important to the formation of their 
identity, and which can be responsible for 
psychological distress.106  
 
There is no mention of identity per se in these harms. 
Thus, it appears that each of these harms can be addressed by 
providing the offspring with non-identifying information about 
their health, heritage, culture and religion and that disclosure of 
the donor’s identity is not required.107 Notably, this type of 
non-identifying information is almost always available now to 
donor offspring in the form of a donor profile that is put 
together by the sperm bank or broker.108 In our view, the 
success of the argument regarding identifying information 
would depend on whether courts accept that there is a real 
difference on the feelings and needs of the children impacted 
                                                
106  Pratten, supra note 8 at 303. 
107  Vardit Ravitsky, “Conceived and Deceived: The Medical Interests of 
Donor-Conceived Individuals” (2012) 42:1 Hastings Center Report 
17.  
108  See for example, online <http://www.xytex.com/>. 
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by adoption and assisted reproduction processes. However, 
donor offspring could argue that a no-disclosure veto or the 
possibility of a no-contact order would both be less intrusive on 
equality rights than a complete ban on identifying 
information.109   
 
Indeed, there is some question about whether 
abolishing donor anonymity and introducing a registry whereby 
identifying information about the donor would be disclosed to 
the offspring when he or she reaches a certain age would 
effectively address the harms allegedly arising from not 
knowing the identity of one’s biological progenitor. That is 
because unless an offspring is aware that he or she is donor-
conceived, he or she will not know that he or she can access 
information from the registry, or request the identity of the 
donor where an identity-release donor has been used.  
 
Donor anonymity facilitates secrecy about the fact that 
a child is donor-conceived, which has been prevalent in 
heterosexual families.110 Historically, the majority of 
heterosexual parents chose to keep the manner of the 
offspring’s conception secret.111 However, there has been a 
                                                
109  See for example, Adoption Information Disclosure Act, 2005, SO 
2005, c 25. 
110  Gruben, “A Number”, supra note 103. 
111  See for example, Jennifer Readings et al, “Secrecy, Disclosure and 
Everything In-Between: Decisions of Parents of Children Conceived 
by Donor Insemination, Egg Donation and Surrogacy” (2011) 22 
Reproductive Biomedicine Online 485; Ken Daniels et al, “Factors 
Associated with Parents’ Decisions to Tell Their Adult Offspring 
About the Offspring’s Donor Conception” (2011) 26 Human 
Reproduction 2783; Firouz Khamsi et al, “Some Psychological 
Aspects of Oocyte Donation from Known Donors on Altruistic 
Basis” (1997) 68 Fertility and Sterility 323 at 326 -27. 
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shift towards greater openness in recent years.112 This shift has 
been prompted, in part, by the increasing use of donated sperm 
by lesbian couples and single women, who because of their 
biology have disclosed the manner of conception to their 
offspring.113 It has also resulted from the greater availability of 
identity-release donors and the prohibition on donor anonymity 
in several jurisdictions.114 The abolition of donor anonymity 
may result in great openness because parents fear that the 
offspring will eventually learn about the manner of their 
conception. However, the extent to which the prohibition on 
donor anonymity has or will eliminate secrecy about the 
offspring’s conception status is debatable. Indeed, Jadva has 
speculated that “[i]t is possible that knowing that the child will 
be able to contact and meet their donor may actually make 
parents less likely to disclose.”115 As a result, it is far from 
certain that abolishing donor anonymity and creating an 
information registry will address the harms suffered by some 
donor offspring. 
 
If the information registry is insufficient, what steps 
could the state undertake to address these harms? The only way 
to ensure that the donor offspring is aware of the manner of 
their conception and thus has an opportunity to access relevant 
information about the donor, would be for the state to introduce 
a mechanism, such as an annotation on a birth certificate, 
                                                
112  DR Beeson et al, “Offspring Searching for Their Sperm Donors: How 
Family Type Shapes the Process” (2011) 26 Human Reproduction 
2415 at 2415. 
113  Ibid at 2416. 
114  Ibid. 
115  Jadva, supra note 95 at 1910; see also S Isaksson, “Two Decades 
After Legislation on Identifiable Donors in Sweden: Are Recipient 
Couples Ready to be Open About Using Gamete Donation?” (2011) 
26 Human Reproduction 853. 
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notifying the offspring that they are conceived using donated 
gametes. The annotation of the birth certificate has been 
considered but not implemented in other jurisdictions like the 
United Kingdom and New Zealand.116 Although a detailed 
examination is beyond the scope of this article, it is likely that 
such an approach would meet with considerable resistance 
from parents as well as from society at large. First, it is likely 
that many parents will argue that mandating disclosure will 
interfere with parental choice. For example, in one empirical 
study on disclosure of conception status, parents regardless of 
their own decision to disclose or not, “consistently expressed 
the opinion that disclosure decisions are private, are highly 
personal, and should be left to the discretion of the individual 
families and not be regulated in any way.”117 Further, it could 
be argued that mandating the disclosure of the use of donated 
gametes places a far more onerous burden on parents who use 
donated gametes than other families. It is trite that there are 
many instances of mistaken paternity; that is, where a man 
erroneously believes that he is the genetic father of his children 
when in fact he is not.118 Despite the prevalence of this 
situation, there is neither a legal obligation on women nor any 
state mechanism to disclose this information to their 
children.119 Thus, we question whether such an approach, while 
potentially effective, would be over reaching. 
                                                
116  Eric Blyth et al, “The Role of Birth Certificates in Relation to Access 
to Biographical and Genetic History in Donor Conception” (2009) 17 
International Journal of Children’s Rights 207 (referring primarily to 
the United Kingdom but also to New Zealand).   
117  Dena Shehab et al, “How Parents Whose Children Have Been 
Conceived with Donor Gametes Make Their Disclosure Decision: 
Contexts, Influences, and Couple Dynamics” (2008) 89 Fertility and 
Sterility 179 at 182. 
118  Gruben, “A Number”, supra note 103. 
119  Wanda Wiegers, “Fatherhood and Misattributed Genetic Paternity in 
Family Law” (2011) 36 Queen’s LJ 623 at para 2. 
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 A final consideration regarding the introduction of a 
registry that provides the offspring with access to identifying 
information about the sperm donor relates to Canada’s heavy 
reliance on imported sperm from the United States. Would it be 
possible to legally compel American sperm donors to disclose 
contact information and other identifying information for 
inclusion into the registry? Although a detailed examination is 
beyond the scope of this article, it is possible that Parliament 
could require the disclosure of certain identifying information 
from the sperm donor as a condition of importing the sperm 
into Canada. There are currently several health and safety 
requirements which sperm must meet before it can be imported 
and used in Canada pursuant to the Processing and 
Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations 
under the Food and Drugs Act.120 Arguably, information 
disclosure could be added to these requirements. Indeed, the 
United Kingdom has adopted such an approach. Donated 
sperm, eggs and embryos may be imported into the United 
Kingdom so long as the donor is identifiable and has provided 
the required information disclosure sheet.121 Such a 
requirement would, however, only provide the offspring with 
information at the time of donation. It would be more difficult, 
                                                
120  Canada SOR/96-254, s 5. See also Health Canada, Guidance on the 
Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception 
Regulations (Ottawa: Health Canada, July 2004), online: Health 
Canada <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/compli-conform/info-prod/ 
don/gui_41_tc-tm-eng.php>. 
121 UK, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, Code of 
Practice, 8th ed, online: Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority <http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/8th_Code_of_Practice.pdf> 
at Guidance Note 16. See also Direction 4 of Compliance Committee 
of the HFEA, “Directions given under the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 as amended”, online: Human Fertilization and 
Embryology Authority <http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/2009-09-
09_General_directions_0006_-_Import_and_export_of_gametes_and 
_embryos_-_version_2.pdf> at 1. 
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and perhaps impossible, to require a foreign donor to provide 
updated health or contact information. Imposing information 
disclosure requirements may negatively impact the supply of 
sperm from the United States, where no such requirements 
exist, to Canada.  
 
For all the reasons stated above, it is difficult to say 
whether a registry of either non-identifying or identifying 
donor information and even the abolition of donor anonymity 
would effectively address the harms suffered by many donor 
offspring. There are several outstanding questions regarding 
the extent to which not knowing the identity of the donor is 
harmful to the offspring, whether a registry without a 
mandatory disclosure requirement would be effective, and the 
potential impact of information disclosure requirements. 
Further, there are legitimate concerns about the impact of an 
information registry on the supply of sperm in Canada. 
Nevertheless, we can safely conclude that the legislature’s 
failure to take any steps to collect or disclose any information 
to offspring, whether non-identifying or identifying, is unlikely 
to satisfy the minimally impairing threshold under section 1 of 




The proportionality analysis seeks to determine whether “the 
overall effects of the law on the claimants [are] 
disproportionate to the government’s objective.”122 Although 
this stage of the analysis is often not determinative of the 
outcome of a case, its importance has recently been 
emphasized by the Supreme Court.123 In our view, if the 
government demonstrates that the law is minimally impairing, 
                                                
122  Hutterian Bretheren, supra note 102 at para 73. 
123  Ibid at paras 75-76.  
Donor Unknown 
 
which we believe is unlikely, the government will almost 
certainly fail at this stage of the section 1 analysis.    
 
When we weigh the benefits and costs of the 
challenged law, the balance appears to be skewed in favour of 
the costs. The government will likely argue that the salutary 
effects of excluding donor offspring from the adoption registry 
include ensuring an adequate supply of sperm for the creation 
of Canadian families and protecting the integrity of families 
that are created through the use of donor sperm. As discussed 
above, whether these effects are truly beneficial remains to be 
seen. Even if the government establishes that this exclusion 
results in real benefits, it will be hard pressed to demonstrate 
that these benefits outweigh the deleterious effects of the 
legislation.  
 
The exclusion of donor offspring from the adoption 
registry, in the absence of any mechanism for obtaining 
information, identifying or not, about the sperm donor is of 
serious detriment to offspring. Although the evidence about the 
extent to which the non-disclosure of identifying information 
about one’s sperm donor results in harm to the donor is 
uncertain, there is no question that the lack of any medical 
information about the donor has a detrimental impact on the 
offspring.124 Further, even though there is some question about 
the effectiveness of a registry, there is no question that some 
offspring who know their conception status would benefit from 
such a registry. When weighing the potential benefits of non-






                                                
124  Ravitsky, supra note 107. 




In conclusion, we believe that there are many laudable reasons 
why donor anonymity should be abolished in Canada. Donor 
anonymity may lead to physical and psychological harm for 
some donor-conceived offspring. Donor-conceived offspring 
have a legitimate interest in information regarding their donors. 
Many legislatures have recognized the realities of this harm in 
adoption and have amended legislation to create adoption 
registries that ensure the collection and disclosure of certain 
information about adoptees and birth parents and include 
appropriate safeguards like disclosure vetos and no contact 
clauses to ensure that the interests of all members of the 
adoption triad are met. The failure of the legislatures to do so in 
the context of ARTs, therefore, appears inconsistent.    
 
The question that remains is whether the best 
mechanism to bring about this much-needed reform is a court 
concluding that provincial adoption legislation violates section 
15 because it is restricted to adoptees and does not extend to 
donor offspring. As we have discussed, it is possible that such a 
section 15 challenge will succeed. Although Justice Adair’s 
analysis in Pratten v. British Columbia (A.G.) falls short in 
several respects, it is possible that to address these 
shortcomings. In our view, if donor-conceived offspring 
successfully establish that their section 15 rights are violated, 
the government will be hard pressed to establish that the 
violation is reasonable and justified under section 1 of the 
Charter.  
 
Regardless of the success or failure of this type of 
Charter challenge, we believe that the best way to address 
collection, use and disclosure of identifying and non-
identifying information in the context of gamete donation is 
through immediate legislative reform. This is so for several 
reasons. Legislative reform will almost certainly result in a 
quicker response. Regardless of the outcome, it is likely that 
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the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s decision will be 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, which will create 
further delays. And even if donor offspring are ultimately 
successful, the courts will almost certainly suspend any 
declaration of invalidity to provide the legislature with time to 
enact Charter compliant legislation. Further, legislative reform 
will be necessary in those provinces where open adoption 
registries do not exist.125 Finally, legislative reform will allow 
for proper consultation with all parties involved and will result 
in an information regime that is tailored to donor offspring and 
addresses the unique concerns that arise in this context. 
Accordingly, we believe that as with adoption, legislative 
reform is the best option at this time for those seeking greater 
openness in sperm donation in Canada.   
                                                
125  Only five provinces have officially opened their adoption records 
including British Columbia, Newfoundland, Alberta, Yukon, and 
Ontario: supra note 34.  To date, the others have established registries 
and search programs as a way to deal with the requests of members of 
the adoption triad for information. 
